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UNDERSTANDING THE SOCRATIC METHOD 

IN LAW SCHOOL TEACHING AFTER THE 

CARNEGIE FOUNDATION'S 

EDUCATING LAWYERS 
JOSEPH A. DICKINSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2007, the Carnegie Foundation for the Ad­
vancement of Teaching released Educating Lawyers: Preparation 
for the Profession of Law.1 This volume is part of a series of com­
parative studies of professional education in medicine, nursing, law, 
engineering, and preparation of the clergy that examines how the 
members of different professions are educated for their responsibil­
ities in the communities they serve.2 The dust jacket describes the 
book as one that "presents a richly detailed picture of how law 
school goes about its great work of transforming students into pro­
fessionals and probes the gaps and the unintended consequences of 
key aspects of the law school experience."3 In the introduction, the 
authors state that professional training "is a complex educational 
process," and that "its value depends, in large part, on how well the 
several aspects of professional training are understood and woven 
into a whole."4 They assert that "the challenge of professional 
preparation for the law" involves "linking the interests of educators 
with the needs of practitioners and the members of the public the 
profession is pledged to serve-in other words, participating in civic 
professionalism."5 The authors write further that it is the aim of 
* Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law Center. I am most grateful for the in­
valuable editorial assistance of Frederick Millett, FPLC class of 2008, and the support of 
my colleagues Jordan Budd and Mitchell Simon, as well as the support of Franklin 
Pierce Law Center. 
1. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter EDUCATING LAWYERS]. 
2. See, e.g., CHARLES R. FOSTER ET AL., EDUCATING CLERGY: TEACHING PRAC­
TICES AND PASTORAL IMAGINATION (2006). 
3. EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 1, at dust jacket. 
4. ld. at 4. 
5. ld. 
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their book to contribute to the understanding of civic 
professionalism.6 
In pursuing this understanding, the authors of Educating Law­
yers give serious effort to describing and comprehending the pro­
cess of academic legal training. In this pursuit, it would seem that 
the authors could not avoid becoming enmeshed in the controversy 
within both the legal profession and legal academia between those 
who decry the perceived lack of skills-based training in legal educa­
tion and those for whom the tradition of Socratic pedagogy in the 
classroom is compelling. Perhaps because the authors sought to 
bring another perspective to the controversy or because they did 
not wish to be identified as partisans of either view, the perspective 
of Educating Lawyers on this controversy is descriptive only and 
thus unilluminating. 
Educating Lawyers writes to the fact of the controversy be­
tween the proponents of skills training and those who argue that 
traditional Socratic pedagogy is the irreducible core of legal educa­
tion, but it does not directly express a position on the controversy. 
Yet, the authors describe all Socratic pedagogy in law school teach­
ing in negative terms, leaving the rational implication that there is 
no value lost in giving up that pedagogy for skills training. Legal 
education would have been better served had Educating Lawyers 
taken a position and then supported it with evidence and argument 
rather than implication. 
I read the Carnegie Foundation's Educating Lawyers with 
great disappointment. I am disappointed that its authors chose to 
support their call for reform simply by joining the common chorus 
of complaint about academic legal training-training that I charac­
terize as facilitated classroom discourse. They unquestioningly take 
up a view of facilitated classroom discourse caricatured in John Os­
born's The Paper Chase and pejoratively identified by contempo­
rary culture as the "Socratic method."7 The discourse the authors 
describe and later label the "case dialogue method" may be simply 
6. Id. ("How well the challenge of linking these interests and needs is met is, in 
large part, determined by how clearly civic professionalism is understood. The aim of 
this book is to contribute to that understanding." (citing WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK 
AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA (2d ed. 
2005))). 
7. See JOHN JAY OSBORNE, THE PAPER CHASE (1971); THE PAPER CHASE 
(Twentieth Century Fox 1973). The "Socratic method" is "[a] technique of philosophi­
cal discussion ... by which the questioner ... questions one or more followers ... 
building on each answer with another question ...." BLACK'S LAW DIcnONARY 1425 
(8th ed. 2004). 
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described as a process whereby a teacher guides a student to chal­
lenge imperfectly defined or justified beliefs and intuitions that 
must be eliminated on the way to the elucidation of a tested solu­
tion to a legal problem. The implicit acceptance of critiques of the 
inefficacy-if not destructiveness-of the method of training per­
sons to be lawyers exclusively by the process of facilitated and pro­
fessionally modeled legal discourse is troubling.8 It is especially 
troubling because the authors' critique, based, they write, on their 
observation and experience, posits that law school classroom teach­
ing takes place in a lecture theater they describe as intensely 
competitive.9 
Educating Lawyers identifies the creation of this environment 
and the pedagogical strategy supported by it as the "case dialogue 
method" and declares it legal education's signature pedagogy,lo By 
this declaration the authors suggest a denigration of all dialogue­
based pedagogy. Accepting the call for skills training as substitu­
tion for training via the "case dialogue method," Educating Law­
yers wrongly denies that dialogue-based pedagogy teaches skills 
that proficient members of the legal profession must be able to 
exploit. 
Dialogue-based law school pedagogy is a sound strategy for 
training lawyers. By pursuing the dialectic exposition of the law 
through facilitated dialogue between teacher and student, and stu­
dent and student, law professors prepare their students for the prac­
tice of law. This dialogue that students practice in class is the 
discourse of the law. To learn to be able to participate construc­
tively in the conversation that is the law is essential to the practice 
of law. 
Educating Lawyers proceeds to its critical description of dia­
logue-based pedagogy in American legal education by way of two 
overbroad mischaracterizations. First, Educating Lawyers treats all 
dialogue-based pedagogy employed by law teachers as a single 
strategy with universal attributes. It conglomerates all dialogue­
based pedagogy employed by law teachers. Second, the authors 
8. See, e.g., Bill Haltom, Good-bye, Professor Kingsfield: Contracts and Socratic 
Method Should Make Way for Real-Life Issues, TENN. B.l., Nov. 2006, at 42; Katherine 
S. Mangan, Lani Guinier Starts Campaign to Curb Use of the Socratic Method, eHRON. 
OF HIGHER Eouc., Apr. 11,1997, at A12; Posting of Brian Leiter to Leiter Reports: A 
Philosophy Blog, The "Socratic Method": The Scandal of American Legal Education, 
http://1eiterreports.typepad.comlblog/2003/10/the_socratic_me.html (Oct. 20,2003, 12:25 
PM). 
9. EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 2. 
10. Id. at 50-54. 
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conflate the pedagogical strategy of dialogue with the environment 
in which they observe dialogue being facilitated. 
By acquiescing to this undisciplined conglomeration of all dia­
logue-based law school classroom pedagogy, Educating Lawyers' 
critique of academic training for the legal profession sweeps too 
broadly. In joining the chorus of Socratic Method critics, Educating 
Lawyers has chosen to stand with those critics for whom the So­
cratic Method has become a shibboleth of all that is wrong with 
legal education. The gravamen of that dissatisfaction is that con­
temporary legal education does not prepare students to be client 
ready. By amassing all dialogue-based pedagogy into the negatively 
described "case dialogue method" and casting that conglomerated 
pedagogy as the "signature pedagogy" of American legal education, 
Educating Lawyers implicitly denies that dialogue-based pedagogy 
develops attributes necessary to the practice of law.!1 When ex­
ploited by a practicing lawyer, however, these are attributes that 
may properly be referred to as skills-skills necessary to client 
representation. 
I. THE SOCRATIC METHOD 
Although the dispute pertains more to the method's efficacy 
than to how it is labeled, it is helpful to look further at the label to 
understand the method. Perhaps an etymologist can explain how it 
is that the dialogue form of classroom legal education has come to 
be labeled the Socratic Method, and then how all law school class­
room pedagogy except the occasional lecture has come to be so 
identified. But, regardless of how it came to be, the proper appella­
tion for the dialogue-based pedagogical strategy identified by Edu­
cating Lawyers as the "case dialogue method"-then cast by them 
as legal education's signature pedagogy-is a matter of dispute.12 
In his erudite analysis of the proper appellation for the stan­
dard law school classroom pedagogy observed and practiced by 
him, Professor Heffernan concludes that the dialogue process that 
law school teachers generally pursue in the lecture theater is not 
Socratic but rather Protagorian.13 He claims that it is a product of 
11. Id. at 187-88. 
12. See id. at 50-59. 
13. See William C. Heffernan, Not Socrates, But Protagoras: The Sophistic Basis 
of Legal Education, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 399, 399 & n.l (1980). Heffernan argues that the 
law school teacher'S practice of teaching through question and answer rather than lec­
ture to reach valid textual interpretations of the legal rules of a case is "a form of 
eristical criticism of texts." Id. at 401 (meaning that textual interpretation is character­
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law professor conceit that the process is labeled Socratic.14 Heffer­
nan's disciplined analysis demonstrates that the best descriptor of 
traditional law school teaching is that the "process of teachers' 
questions and students' answers" is "properly ... called dialectical 
as well as eristical," though the term dialectic was later refined from 
its "looser meaning in the time of Protagoras and Socrates" and, as 
a technical matter, may no longer be a proper descriptor.15 
There is a large body of formal comment on the singular use 
and efficacy of the "case method" and Socratic Method in Ameri­
can legal education dating from a Carnegie Foundation report pub­
lished in 1914.16 More contemporary comment appears in the 
context of the post-Paper Chase dispute about the Socratic 
Method's place in legal educationP Professor Guinier's judgment 
that the Socratic Method is used in law schools to perpetuate hier­
archy by intimidation is elaborated further in Becoming Gentlemen: 
Women, Law School, and Institutional Change .18 One practitioner 
opines that nothing conveyed by the method he experienced in law 
school has proved useful.19 However, not all commentary pursues 
ized by debate). He then seeks to prove that the purpose of Socrates in pursuing dia­
logue was to find ethical truth and, in that way, achievc moral reform. Id. at 407-12. 
This contrasts with the purpose of Protagorian question and answer whose purpose was 
the practice of forensic technique "to make the weaker cause ... the stronger [cause]." 
Id. at 414-15 (internal quotation marks omitted). Victory in debate, beyond learning to 
see both sides of an issue, was an important goal in its own right. [d. 
14. With less charity in his observations, Professor Leiter, who refers to himself as 
a fully recovered Socratic Method teacher, perceives not only conceit but presump­
tuousness in legal education's choice to label its pedagogy Socratic. Leiter, supra note 
8. Leiter observes that professors of philosophy do not employ Socratic dialogue in 
their teaching of philosophy. Id. For this reason he declaims that the use of dialogue, 
purportedly Socratic or otherwise, is a scandal both for its presumptuousness and its 
manifest inefficacy. Id. 
15. Heffernan, supra note 13, at 405-06. 
16. See generally JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD 
IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION 
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1914); Heffernan, supra note 14, at 399 n.1 
(providing an extensive sample of comment on the Socratic Method published between 
1914 and 1975). 
17. See, e.g., Mangan, supra note 8 (describing the conflicting views within the 
University of Pennsylvania's law school faculty by juxtaposing the assertion that the 
Socratic teaching style is intimidating against the traditional claim that this form of 
pedagogy is best for leading students to think like lawyers). 
18. LANI GUINIER, MICHELLE FINE, & JANE BALIN, BECOMING GENTLEMEN: 
WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 58-62 (1997). Professor Guinier 
and her coauthors accept the stereotypical harsh and demeaning Socratic Method pro­
cess practiced around them as the norm and call for its elimination from law school 
pedagogy as a first step to reform. [d. at 72. 
19. Haltom, supra note 8, at 44. 
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the current negative vogue. There is positive regard expressed by 
many. For example, third-year law student Ann Marie Pedersen 
lauds her Socratic training and its "good grillin": 
[W]hen it's done well, the Socratic experience can be challenging, 
motivating and even fun. And no, I'm not a masochist. 
So far I have had a few doctrinal professors who have made 
law school worth every penny. They employ this method of 
pedagogy and do it well. These professors motivated me to work 
hard and to get it right. As a result, I've developed the confi­
dence and analytical abilities to rise beyond my first-semester 
grades. 
I came to law school to become a lawyer, not just to learn 
the law. To do that, one must think like a lawyer. Thinking like a 
lawyer means having a strong grasp of analytical reasoning and 
the ability to make and defend an argument aloud and in public. 
To learn to think like a lawyer I need the Socratic method.20 
I did not discover any report of empirical research as to the 
efficacy or inefficacy of law school Socratic pedagogy. However, 
Roger G. Tweed and Darrin R. Lehman employed a Confucian­
Socratic framework to analyze the cultural influence on academic 
learning in genera1.21 Following a critical analysis of the teaching 
process described as Socratic, Tweed and Lehman argue that "some 
of what passes for instruction in critical thinking is not in fact mod­
eling a superior or even Socratic approach to thinking. Rather, it is 
modeling an extreme Western and somewhat distorted Socratic 
value system in which criticism receives more emphasis than think­
ing ...."22 
Two thoughtful practitioners of the art make the case that prin­
cipled pursuit of genuine dialogue-where the teacher and student 
are simultaneously teachers and students-is a sound, if not essen­
tial, pedagogical means to the professional development of law stu­
dents. First, Professor Elizabeth Garrett makes a cogent case for 
the efficacy of the Socratic Method for the development of skills 
essential to being prepared to meet the varying roles lawyers are 
20. Ann Marie Pedersen, In Defense of the Oft-Maligned Socratic Method: Sure 
It's Scary, But the Approach Instills Skills That Every Lawyer Needs, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 
11, 2006, at S6. 
21. See generally Roger G. Tweed & Darrin R. Lehman, Learning Considered 
Within a Cultural Context: Confucian and Socratic Approaches, 57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 
89 (2002). 
22. Id. at 97. 
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called upon to fulfill in their professional lives.23 Professor Gar­
rett's case against elimination is coupled with recognition that some 
of the criticism of the law school Socratic Method is due to its use in 
the hands of bad teachers.24 In reaction to this, Professor Garrett 
calls for faculty evaluations by both peers and students, followed by 
discussion of legal pedagogy within the faculty directed to how 
professors might refine their skills.25 
Second, Emeritus Professor Donald Marshall, in his inaugural 
lecture on taking the position of Law Alumni Distinguished 
Teacher at the University of Minnesota Law School, posited that 
"the quintessential evocative mode [of teaching], properly used, is 
the dialogue,"26 and that the phrase "Socratic Method" used in 
describing law school teaching is a synonym for dialogueP His po­
sition is that principled exploitation of the pedagogy of dialogue is 
"the irreducible core of legal education. "28 . 
These established law professors do not describe the dialogue 
they facilitate as combat or verbal duels where students engage in 
intense competition with the teacher or each other. Rather, Profes­
sor Marshall declares that his teaching through dialogue is disci­
plined by the principle that "genuine dialog ... is a dialog based on 
respect for the promise of the students' minds and a determination 
to help them realize that promise by providing intellectual chal­
lenge. "29 To this end, Professor Marshall asserts that the teacher 
must manifest the professional and personal characteristics that fol­
low from the ultimate purpose of the dialogue.3D That purpose, he 
declares, is "to maximize learning by encouraging participation in 
the process of discovery, including, most significantly, discovery of 
the dialogue as a means of autonomous learning."31 For this pur­
pose to have effect, "the teacher must have [an attitude of] genuine 
23. Elizabeth Garrett, Becoming Lawyers: The Role of the Socratic Method in 
Modern Law Schools, 1 GREEN BAG 20 199 (1998) (reviewing GUINIER, FINE & BALIN, 
supra note 18). 
24. [d. at 203. 
25. [d. For a structured inter-faculty peer review observation and evaluation pro­
gram directed to improving law school teaching, see Mitchell M. Simon, M.E. Occhi­
alino & Robert L. Fried, Herding Cats: Improving Law School Teaching, 49 J. LEGAL 
EDuc. 256 (1999). 
26. Donald G. Marshall, Lecture, Socratic Method and the Irreducible Core of 
Legal Education, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1, 17 (2005). 
27. [d. at 8. 
28. Id. at 7-8. 
29. Id. at 2. 
30. Id. at 13-14. 
31. Id. at 13. 
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respect for classroom space and time, for the dialog process, and for 
all potential participants," and this respect must be "evident by her 
preparation."32 It is further evidenced by a sense of compassion 
manifest in recognition "that although dialog imaginatively used is 
the most effective pedagogical vehicle for learning the irreducible 
core of legal education, it can be, when misused, destructive. "33 
The teacher must be aware that while lawyers may often be 
required to speak their views in public, knowing those views will be 
subject to critique and criticism, new students are likely not prac­
ticed in that skill. They are in a law school class to acquire and 
practice that skill. Public denigration of a student's proposition the 
first time that student responds cannot be sound. Compassion re­
quires coaching, not denigration. 
Coaching and practice are the means to prepare students for 
entry into the legal profession. Dialogue pursued as Professor Mar­
shall counsels is how the lawyering skills and attributes are acquired 
through the process of active learning at the direction of active 
coaching. This preparation for entry into the legal profession must 
be adequate for any of the roles lawyers may be asked or choose to 
assume. Both Professors Garrett and Marshall posit that the irre­
ducible attribute of lawyers that law professors seek to instill is that 
they will be problem solvers. While some of our students may 
"never enter a courtroom as advocates, ... they will counsel clients, 
devise strategies for legal challenges [both] to [and facing] social 
institutions like schools or prisons, draft legislation and advise state 
and federal lawmakers, or run businesses. "34 
Through dialogue, Professor Garrett seeks to teach her "stu­
dents the habit of rigorous and critical analysis of the arguments 
they hear,"35 "to learn to reason by analogy,"36 and further to know 
"the practice of assessing and revising their own ideas and ap­
proaches in light of new information or different reasoning" re­
vealed through the discourse, as well as demanding that students 
think and listen critically.37 Through dialogue, a student who is ap­
propriately challenged by the professor learns that unexamined be­
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 14-15. 
34. Garrett, supra note 23, at 207. 
35. Id. at 202. 
36. /d. at 20l. 
37. Id. at 202. "The goal is to learn how to analyze legal problems," to learn by 
real experience, where the edges of ideas are located, and to know the task of finding 
words with which to successfully communicate an idea for replicable application. Id. at 
201-02. 
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liefs, assumptions, glib response, or clever retort alone are poor 
ground to stand on and cannot be the basis for understanding the 
effect of the law on those subject to it, or be the source of sound 
solutions to the varying problems that the student will be asked to 
resolve as a lawyer. Challenging the student to these realizations 
through dialogue, the professor will facilitate the development of 
thinking skills and habits appropriate to whatever job the student 
takes on or any problem the student will confront. 
Professor Marshall describes his understanding of the dialogue 
method as "teacher and student, by studying together, develop that 
constellation of cognitive and moral capacities necessary to under­
stand the nature of law."38 He invokes President Garfield's "defini­
tion of the ideal university" as a professor "at one end of a log and 
a student at the other."39 
The method of genuine dialogue is straightforward. Whether 
the method is properly labeled Socratic, Protagorian, dialectic, or 
simply dialogue, what the law teacher does first is formulate a ques­
tion that requires a response from the student. That first question is 
calculated to direct the discourse toward a tested solution to the 
legal problem under investigation and the rational elimination of 
imperfectly defined and unjustified intuitions. This direction is 
achieved by the teacher responding to the student's answer (often 
predictable in the teacher's experience) directly, when direction is 
required, or with a question that tests the foundation of the student 
response when the basis of that response is unsound or requires 
illumination. The method is a means of participatory learning that 
coaches students to develop the abilities to think critically and to 
present ideas effectively. The method is successful because it re­
quires student participants, whether actively or vicariously by lis­
tening, to articulate, develop, and defend positions that illuminate 
the law under investigation. Where the subject matter of the dis­
course is the analysis of judicial opinions, "students have to learn 
what counts, in light of a received rhetorical tradition, as persuasive 
justifications for judicial answers to particular legal problems. Con­
comitantly, they develop a sense of which arguments of counsel are 
likely to be regarded as convincing, which provocative, and which 
acceptable. "40 
38. Marshall, supra note 26, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
39. Id. at 8. 
40. Id. at 6. 
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Dialogue pedagogy delivers more than thinking skills. Profes­
sor Garrett takes the position that speaking in public-whether to 
client groups, a meeting of lawmakers, corporate boards, or in 
courtrooms or administrative proceedings-is integral to becoming 
a lawyer.41 The demand of dialogue pedagogy teaches students, 
"[i]n an atmosphere of relatively low stakes," to "present ideas to 
groups, defend those ideas, and propose solutions to legal 
problems."42 
Phillip E. Areeda made the same point.43 In dialogue based on 
eristic analysis of judicial opinions, students learn what is material 
and relevant to understanding a legal problem or its solution.44 
Students also develop through the dialogue process the keen regard 
for the facts essential to sound lawyering. All of this is accom­
plished through the teacher's challenge to unjustified assumptions, 
untested beliefs, and unquestioned habits, followed by direction to­
ward sound solutions. The process of the dialogue conversation 
also teaches the vocabulary of the studied law through its use. The 
form of professional legal discourse is practiced as the teacher mod­
els it. One need only negotiate the resolution of a controversy over 
the telephone or before a planning board or a board of directors to 
know the centrality of the skills practiced and acquired through par­
ticipation in the dialogue process. 
Educating Lawyers acknowledges, albeit only once and with a 
telling lack of emphasis, the development of skills resulting from 
dialogue pedagogy: "the surface structure of the pedagogy-ques­
tion and answer-relates to its deep structure, the teaching of legal 
reasoning. Gradually, case by case, students discover that reading 
with understanding means being able to talk about human conflicts 
in a distinctively legal voice. "45 The authors note that thinking 
"like a lawyer emerges as the ability to translate messy situations 
into the clarity and precision of legal procedure" and then to find 
solutions and advocate for a client.46 Dialogue pedagogy promotes 
learning this "translation of human conflicts into legal language" by 
repetition much as weightlifters build through exercise.47 Similar to 
41. Garrett, supra note 23, at 207. 
42. Id. at 204. 
43. Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method (SM) (Lecture at Puget Sound, 11311 
90), 109 HARV. L. REV. 911, 922 (1996). 
44. Id. 
45. EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 53. 
46. !d. at 54. 
47. Id. 
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Marshall and Garrett, the authors of Educating Lawyers believe 
that "[t]he case-dialogue method is a potent form of learning-by­
doing. As such, it necessarily shapes the minds and dispositions of 
those who apprentice through it."48 
II. THE ATTACK ON THE SOCRATIC METHOD 
Educating Lawyers may be read to support the stance of 
Areeda, Garrett, and Marshall that important professional skills are 
taught by means of dialogue pedagogy; however, it may also be 
read to have accepted the lament of the critics that the pedagogy 
does not produce client-ready graduates. The work does not di­
rectly express an opinion on the question of whether traditional So­
cratic pedagogy should be abjured in favor of skills training, yet the 
description of the authors' observations of law school Socratic 
pedagogy creates an impression that they think that this practice 
should be left in the past. Direct critique with supporting argument 
would have better served legal education. 
Regrettably, Educating Lawyers conflates the process of dia­
logue with the environment its authors observed surrounding it. 
The work describes that environment as "a situation of intense and 
public competition with fellow students" and a place where "stu­
dents are expected to engage in intense verbal duels and competi­
tions with the teacher as they struggle to discern facts and principles 
of interpretation within a case."49 This picture is hardly consistent 
with that drawn by Professor Marshall of the teacher on one end of 
a log in conversation with the student on the other before an en­
gaged class of eighty, teacher and student together seeking in dia­
logue to find principle and to abandon misconception. 50 Nor is it 
consistent with his principles of genuine dialogue-respect, sound 
preparation, and compassion.51 It is belied by the observation of 
both Professors Areeda and Garrett that "the modern Socratic 
Method differs dramatically from the stereotype. "52 They claim, in 
fact, that "[t]he relentless questioner who never utters a declarative 
sentence is extinct. "53 A teacher can hardly coach or mentor a stu­
48. Id. at 74. 
49. Id. at 2, 24. 
50. Marshall, supra note 26, at 5-6. 
51. Id. at 13-16. 
52. Garrett, supra note 23, at 201. 
53. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Areeda, supra note 43, at 
919). 
108 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:97 
dent towards the acquisition of a professional skill while engaged in 
intense competition with that student for some kind of ascendancy. 
Educating Lawyers describes this competition as ubiquitous 
(thus vindicating Professor Guinier's perception of the prevalence 
and destructiveness of the harsh stereotypical Socratic Method).54 
It explains the presence of this competitive, unsupportive classroom 
environment by describing two related phenomena. First, it notes 
that at the standard model law schools faculty are selected from the 
graduates of leading law schools. Accordingly, "[t]he contest for 
distinction and influence is relentless and consuming," in part be­
cause faculty are themselves products of the case dialogue pedagog­
ical system and seek in teaching to replicate the contest at which 
they excelled.55 And second, it observes that at elite law schools 
the "case dialogue method," together with the practice of grading 
on the curve and sorting by class rank, is used for the purpose of 
sorting out (from those already sorted by admissions) those stu­
dents qualified for distinction with careers as scholars, professors, 
jurists, and associates at paradigm law firms with the rewards of the 
"power track. "56 The implication is that having survived the com­
petitive sorting process, law teachers will necessarily utilize the 
same teaching methods they experienced-and likely thrived 
under-in law school. 
The competitive atmosphere they observed led the Carnegie 
authors to express some concern as they lamented that this "atmos­
phere militates against a cooperative learning environment."57 
Furthermore: 
[t]here is evidence that law school typically blares a set of salient, 
if unintentional, messages that undercut the likely success of ef­
forts to make students more attentive to ethical matters. The 
competitive atmosphere of most law schools generates a wide­
spread perception that students have entered a high-stakes, zero­
sum game. The competitive classroom climate is reinforced by 
the peculiarities of assessment in first-year courses. The ubiqui­
tous practice of grading on the curve ensures that, no matter how 
talented or hard-working the students are, only a predetermined 
number will receive A's. Such a context is unlikely to suggest 
54. See EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 2, 24. See generally GUINIER, 
FINE & BALIN, supra note 18. 
55. EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 90. 
56. [d. at 137. 
57. Id. at 166. 
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solidarity with one's fellow students or much straying from a sin­
gle-minded focus on competitive achievement.58 
Perhaps the Carnegie authors meant to advance their agenda 
of reform in legal education by casting the Socratic Method of case 
dialogue as they did. But the position that all dialogue-based legal 
education, or even discourse, must take place in an environment of 
combat between teacher and student, a "situation of intense compe­
tition" engendered by the teacher who must pursue victory, is not 
sound. By his principles of genuine dialogue, it is clear that Profes­
sor Marshall does not seek to create that type of environment and 
that he believes it is not necessary to do SO.59 By her description, 
Professor Garrett's teaching goals are not her competitive 
ascendancy.60 
III. My EXPERIENCES WITH THE SOCRATIC METHOD 
I came to law school teaching convinced by my high school and 
collegiate educational experience that the negative educational ex­
perience I had in law school in the unsupportive, competitive envi­
ronment observed by Educating Lawyers did not have to be 
replicated for the successful professional training of aspiring law­
yers. My goal when entering a classroom-where my task is to fa­
cilitate the discourse-is that my students and I learn something 
together, not that my students fall at my feet. I can honor the 
teachers in my past in no better way. 
I had a number of very good teacher mentors before law 
school. These teachers used dialogue. They sat at either end of a 
Harkness table with a circle of students around the table.61 These 
58. Id. at 31. 
59. Marshall, supra note 26, at 13-16. 
60. Garrett, supra note 23, at 200-02. 
61. A Harkness Table is an oval table at which twelve students with their teacher 
sit for class discussion. Phillips Exeter Academy, The Amazing Harkness Philosophy, 
http://www.exeter.edu/admissions/147_harkness.aspx(lastvisitedMar.15.2009).It 
takes its name from a graduate and benefactor of Phillips Exeter Academy in Exeter, 
New Hampshire, who designed and donated a number of these tables to the school. His 
hope was that the tables would encourage classes to be conducted in a discursive man­
ner with each participant able to have eye contact with all other participants in the 
conversation. Phillips Exeter Academy, The History of Harkness Teaching, http://www. 
exeter.edu/admissionsI147_5238.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2009). For this reason the 
phrase "Harkness Table" is sometimes used to refer to that style of teaching, particu­
larly in American boarding schools and small private colleges. See Tyler C. Tingley, 
Educating with the Harkness Table, Scholar Search Associates, http://www.scholar 
searchassoc.comlarticles-schoolsINHPHEINHPHE_020604.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 
2009). 
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teachers propounded carefully considered questions to the group. 
Following up these questions, the teachers constructed conversa­
tions inclusive of all. All students contributed to the conversation. 
These conversations were energized not by competitive zeal. They 
were energized by our excitement at following the path to under­
standing the subject at hand. I have tried to teach as the good 
teachers I experienced in my life taught, through disciplined ques­
tion and answer, pursued not as verbal tag but as a test of assump­
tion, intuition, reason, and belief that honors student participants 
for their courage in speaking their ideas before a group, knowing 
those ideas are to be tested. 
I think good dialogue teaching is a product more of attitude 
than of technique. That attitude must be informed by Professor 
Marshall's principles of genuine dialogue.62 It must be an attitude 
that aims at creating an environment where teacher and student are 
both 'simultaneously teachers and students. This means that when a 
law teacher recognizes the palpably reticent student (who saw The 
Paper Chase before starting law school)63 trembling in anticipation 
of the possible demand of being called to respond without prior 
notice-the "cold call"64-and then calls on that student for a re­
sponse before his or her classmates, the teacher must respond to 
that student's response with gentleness, finding in it a thing of value 
to the discussion. This situation does not call for the teacher to use 
the response to prove how smart she is relative to the student. If 
the valuable response is not the student's first response, coaching a 
valuable response from the first response with follow-up questions 
honors the student's achievement in overcoming reticence and con­
firms his capacity to contribute. At a minimum, that student and all 
the others in the room who empathize, as most do, with their class­
mate will have learned that they can respond and no untoward 
thing necessarily results. If a teacher gives pre-class notice to a stu­
dent who will be called upon, that student will prepare, respond, 
and maybe even respond with excellence. Thus, that student and 
the empathetic class have had a compelling lesson in the lawyering 
skill of sound preparation and the satisfaction in its exercise. I have 
been advantaged in my pursuit of genuine dialogue pedagogy not 
only by having had great mentor teachers but also because I have 
62. Marshall, supra note 26, at 2. 
63. THE PAPER CHASE, supra note 7. 
64. EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 75. 
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been free of the competitive pressure and its ideology found by Ed­
ucating Lawyers to be ubiquitous at the standard law school. 
The law school where I teach, Franklin Pierce Law Center, was 
founded with the specific intent of not replicating the standard law 
school characterized by Educating Lawyers.65 I have not been re­
quired to confront or exploit the effects of the stimuli to competi­
tion there noted. Franklin Pierce successfully resisted employers' 
demands for class rank until 1993 and the mandatory curve until 
2001 when we sectioned our first-year required courses. 
My experience as a teacher has convinced me that Professor 
Marshall's thesis that the dialogue process is the process of the law 
is sound and important.66 A teacher cannot expect his students to 
accept the gifts he is offering them unless he will appreciate and 
accept the gifts those students offer in return. Participation in dia­
logue pedagogy teaches more than the thinking and problem-solv­
ing skills noted by Professor Garrett.67 Dialogue is at least the 
process of the common law by which judges (or legislatures in reac­
tion) in the United States' legal system apply, create, and imple­
ment law. Through dialogue, judges and legislators test a proposed 
principle of decision for a challenging legal question by argument 
and counterargument. In the face of changing facts over time and 
experience, testing in this crucible of argument and counterargu­
ment is the law's path to coherent and replicable solutions. This 
mode of testing is mirrored by the dialogue process. 
Participation in the process of dialogue by question and answer 
teaches a student how to function in the legal process that dialogue 
mirrors. Students learn the lawyer's role by doing it. In this way, 
students exercise the skills necessary to perform that role and build 
an understanding of the law.68 
The power of this process of inclusive dialogue on the law has 
been demonstrated to me in law school classrooms where the stu­
dents' prior experience of teaching was neither interactive nor par­
ticipatory. Students in classes in Russia, Bulgaria, and the People's 
Republic of China, where I have facilitated classes in law, have a 
common educational experience. The teacher-scholar has had ac­
cess to the library where the stacks are closed to students and has 
read all there is on the subject of his study. By informed intuition, 
65. See EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 2 (characterizing the standard law 
school). 
66. See Marshall, supra note 26, at 5-6. 
67. Garrett, supra note 23, at 201. 
68. Marshall, supra note 26, at 5-6. 
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that teacher has conceived an efficient organization of the subject 
that can be articulated to his students. This teacher's purpose in 
going to the classroom is to download that knowledge to his stu­
dents. Students are presumed to come to the classroom as empty 
vessels. The role of these vessels in the educational process is to 
open themselves up to receiving the words of the teacher as he 
pours them into the students' passively receiving minds. 
In all three countries, when given the privilege of a classroom 
filled with students with this experience of university education, I 
resisted following the form of downloading acquired knowledge in 
favor of pursuing the process of dialogue I know. Shock is not the 
right word to describe the students' collective response the moment 
I left the podium to ask the class: "What do you think?" In each 
instance the students were not shocked-they were nonplussed. 
Nonplussed, I think, because the idea that a person with the role 
and status of a teacher could be interested in what they thought or 
act as if it mattered was beyond their classroom experiences. 
My favorite such moment was in a Russian classroom where I 
was presenting through a contemporaneous translator who was so 
good that the conversation went on seamlessly, as if the translator 
were in my frontal lobe. It was seamless until I turned to the class 
and for the first time asked: "What do you think?" The translator 
choked. In her surprise and distaste she could not bring herself to 
find the Russian words until a student with some English skill 
prompted her past the impasse. The translator was unable to 
achieve seamlessness again until I had conducted two more classes. 
The students got it long before the translator. Our conversation 
moved on past the translator's hesitation until a student stood and 
demanded that the male students, as well as the professor of crimi­
nal law then sitting in, stop interrupting her comments and cutting 
off her contribution. Her fellow students felt the rebuke as I 
honored her request by continuing the conversation of her idea 
with her. Thereafter they responded with courtesy. These students 
left behind the experience of being nonplussed as they found in our 
conversation their power to identify and know the beginning of the 
truth. As they accepted, through practice, the process of guided 
inquiry, they came to understand that the law is both central au­
thority and a subject that becomes more discernable through their 
own reasoning together. They knew they had a role in the process 
of the conversation of the law. 
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CONCLUSION 
My experience as a law professor has brought me to the con­
clusion that Professors Areeda, Garrett, and Marshall are right. 
They are correct that Socratic dialogue pursued as they describe, 
and not the "case dialogue method" described by Educating Law
yers ,69 is a compelling method of pedagogy necessary for the sound 
preparation of students in the practice of law. The dialogue process 
effectively teaches the method of the law as well as the skills and 
attitudes essential to the sound implementation and exploitation of 
that method. By conglomerating all dialogue-based law school 
pedagogy in its critique, then conflating the dialogue process with 
the intense competitive environment the authors observed, Educat­
ing Lawyers has done a disservice to those committed practitioners 
of the art of genuine dialogue. 
The hallmark of genuine dialogue is "respect for the promise 
of the students' minds and a determination to help them realize that 
promise by providing intellectual challenge. "70 The hallmark is not 
intense verbal dueling and competition with the teacher. A teacher 
motivated to "prevail" in the classroom cannot illicit student under­
standing that genuine dialogue is a means of autonomous learning. 
Educating Lawyers' call for reform should not be advanced at thc 
sacrifice of genuine dialogue pedagogy, a pedagogy that in my ex­
perience, as well as in the experience of noted law professors, in­
stills essential professional qualities and skills in those law students 
who participate in its process?1 
69. EDUCATING LAWYERS, supra note 1, at 75. 
70. Id. at 2. 
71. The call for reform asks specifically that law schools focus on teaching "Mac­
Crate skills." See id. at 73-76. MacCrate skills, named for a report commonly called the 
"MacCrate Report" are professional skills required in the practice of law. See TASK 
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS & THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, AM. BAR ASS'N, 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTIN­
UUM (1992). The MacCrate Report advanced the position that law schools were not 
giving adequate attention to teaching students professionalism and the skills necessary 
to the practice of law. See id. at 4. The Report admonished law schools that more 
instruction in the skills necessary to the day-to-day practice of law should be empha­
sized in instruction. It also specified a list of fundamental lawyering skills (interviewing, 
researching, fact gathering, etc.) that should be the focus of law school training. See id. 
at 138-41. 
